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We present a mathematical framework based on quantum interval-valued probability measures to
study the effect of experimental imperfections and finite precision measurements on defining aspects
of quantum mechanics such as contextuality and the Born rule. While foundational results such as
the Kochen-Specker and Gleason theorems are valid in the context of infinite precision, they fail to
hold in general in a world with limited resources. Here we employ an interval-valued framework to
establish bounds on the validity of those theorems in realistic experimental environments. In this
way, not only can we quantify the idea of finite-precision measurement within our theory, but we
can also suggest a possible resolution of the Meyer-Mermin debate on the impact of finite-precision
measurement on the Kochen-Specker theorem.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this investigation, we explore the implica-
tions of extending conventional quantum-mechanical
probability measures to include the effect of imper-
fect measurements. There are long-standing debates
in the foundations of quantum mechanics regard-
ing the tension between finite precision measurement
and contextuality [1, 2]. The outcome of a theory
that is contextual depends upon whether compati-
ble sets of observables are measured together or sep-
arately; a non-contextual theory gives the same re-
sults in either case. A classic example of the varying
opinions on the impact of imprecision is the claim by
Meyer [3] that finite-precision measurements invali-
date the spirit of the Kochen-Specker theorem. This
claim was countered in the same year by Havlicek et
al. [4] and Mermin [5] and the debate continues to
be an active topic of research [1, 2, 6–13].
The Kochen-Specker theorem [14–20] is in essence
a mathematical statement about contextuality, as-
serting that in a Hilbert space of dimension 𝑑 ≥ 3, it
is impossible to associate determinate probabilities,
𝜇(𝑃𝑖) = 0 or 1, with every projection operator 𝑃𝑖,
in such a way that, if a set of commuting 𝑃𝑖 satisfies∑︀
𝑖 𝑃𝑖 = 1, then
∑︀
𝑖 𝜇(𝑃𝑖) = 1. Meyer showed that
one can assign determinate probabilities 0 or 1 to
the measurement outcomes when the Hilbert space
is defined over the field of rational numbers, there-
fore nullifying the theorem [3]. However, Mermin
then argued that measurement outcomes must de-
pend smoothly on slight changes in the experimen-
tal configuration, leading him to assert that the im-
pact of Meyer’s negative result is “unsupportable”
on physical grounds [5]. The question of how to ad-
dress this controversy, and the effect of finite preci-
sion on measurements in general, is therefore a fun-
damental problem of physics. How does one develop
mathematical theories of quantum mechanics that
are intrinsically, rather than only implicitly, consis-
tent with the resources available for the realistic ac-
curacy of an actual measurement?
In this paper, we extend our previous work on
the foundations of computability in quantum physics
by exploring the application of interval-valued prob-
ability measures (IVPMs) to achieving a coherent
formulation of finite-resource quantum mechanics.
From this starting point, we develop a mathemat-
ical framework that includes the uncertainties of
finite precision and imperfections in the quantum
measurement process. In particular, we are able
to suggest a way to quantify the concept of imper-
fect quantum measurement and its impact on the
interpretation of the Kochen-Specker and Gleason
theorems and their implications for the foundations
of quantum mechanics. We have reason to believe
that essential objectives of our program to achieve a
computable theory of quantum mechanics and finite-
resource measurement, attempted previously with
computable number systems [21–23], may be achiev-
able by extending classical IVPMs [24] to the quan-
tum domain. We thus begin by axiomatizing a quan-
tum interval-valued probability measure (QIVPM)
framework.
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To put our investigation in perspective, we note
that Meyer attributes finite-precision errors exclu-
sively to the description of the states defined in
a general Hilbert space. Mermin’s response ar-
gues against Meyer’s interpretation but, indeed, ac-
cepts his framework. Others, however, have argued
that the effect of finite-precision measurements on
the Kochen-Specker theorem requires a different ap-
proach altogether (see for example Ax and Kochen’s
communication cited by Cabello [8]). Here, we pro-
pose such a new approach.
Our approach, based on QIVPMs, introduces the
concept of 𝛿-determinism, where 𝛿 quantifies the ef-
fect of finite-precision uncertainties on measurement
outcomes. Our parameter 𝛿 is not necessarily related
to the description of states; we are agnostic about
attributing elements of reality to the state function.
Instead, we attribute lack of certainty to the uncer-
tain results obtained through the use of a measuring
instrument. Thus, the parameter 𝛿 in our framework
reflects insufficient knowledge of the experimenter,
which could be due to a variety of reasons related
to imperfections of devices. For example, a typical
question that an experimenter may not be able to
answer accurately would be “did an electron land in
the left half or the right half of the screen?” There
are cases in which the electron would land too close
to the middle of the screen for the experimenter to
be able to determine with certainty that it was left
or right of the center. We simply record this impre-
cision by generalizing the probabilities assigned to
events to intervals reflecting the uncertainties.
We then recast the Kochen-Specker theorem us-
ing 𝛿-determinism to quantify the effects of fi-
nite precision and imperfections on contextuality.
When 𝛿 = 0, the generalized theorem reduces
to the conventional one, but as 𝛿 varies from
0 to 1 we note a transition from contextuality
to non-contextuality. For a non-vanishing range
of 𝛿, quantum-mechanical contextuality continues to
hold, maintaining the Kochen-Specker result, but at
a certain fixed value, 𝛿 = 13 , there is a sharp tran-
sition to non-contextuality, parallel in spirit to a
phase transition. These results provide a new in-
sight into the Meyer-Mermin debate by presenting
a theory in which there is a parameter interpolating
between what appeared previously to be irreconcil-
able aspects of contextuality.
We also investigate the second key aspect of im-
precise quantum measurement, which is its statis-
tical nature as reflected in the application of the
Born rule [19, 25, 26] determining the probability
of a given measurement outcome. Here, Gleason’s
theorem [16, 18, 27] establishes that there is no al-
ternative to the Born rule by demonstrating, using
reasonable continuity arguments in Hilbert spaces
of dimension 𝑑 ≥ 3, the existence of a unique
state 𝜌 consistent with the statistical predictions
computed from the Born rule. Our question then
concerns what happens when infinite precision can-
not be achieved. We are able to show that, while
a QIVPM incorporating the effects of finite preci-
sion might not be consistent with Gleason’s unique
state 𝜌 on all projectors defined on a Hilbert spaceℋ
of dimension 𝑑 ≥ 3, there is a mathematically pre-
cise sense in which one recovers the original Gleason
theorem asymptotically. Specifically, it is possible to
construct a class of QIVPMs representing bounded
resources that is parameterized by the size of the in-
tervals. We then demonstrate that all QIVPMs in
this class are consistent with a non-empty “ball” of
quantum states whose radius is defined by the maxi-
mal length of the intervals characterizing the uncer-
tainties. As the size of the intervals goes to zero,
this ball of quantum states converges to a point rep-
resenting the unique state consistent with the Born
rule and Gleason’s theorem.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we be-
gin by introducing the foundations of quantum prob-
ability space and fuzzy measurement. We then move
on to introduce the concept of quantum interval-
valued probability measures in Sec. III. These
QIVPMs will provide the mathematical framework
we need to quantify the impact of finite precision
measurements on quantum mechanics. For instance,
in Sec. IV, we quantify the domain of validity of a
contextual measurement, thus addressing the condi-
tions under which the Kochen-Specker theorem ap-
plies. This provides a way not only of resolving the
Meyer-Mermin debate, but also of revealing a pre-
cise transition to non-contextuality; these are the
results of our Thm. 3. In Sec. V, we study Glea-
son’s theorem in the context of imprecise measure-
ments, concluding that QIVPMs provide a frame-
work with quantitative bounds in which Gleason’s
theorem, while formally invalid in a universe with
bounded resources, holds asymptotically in a math-
ematically precise way. Finally, we present our con-
clusions in Sec. VI.
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II. FUZZY MEASUREMENTS
A probability space is a mathematical abstraction
specifying the necessary conditions for reasoning co-
herently about collections of uncertain events [28–
31]. In the quantum case, the events of interest
are specified by projection operators 𝑃 satisfying the
condition 𝑃 2 = 𝑃 . These include the empty pro-
jector 0, the identity projector 1, projectors of the
form |𝜑⟩⟨𝜑| where |𝜑⟩ is a pure quantum state (an
element of a Hilbert space ℋ), sums of orthogonal
projectors 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 with 𝑃0𝑃1 = 0, and products of
commuting projectors 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 with 𝑃0𝑃1 = 𝑃1𝑃0.
In a quantum probability space [16, 27, 32–34], each
event 𝑃𝑖 is mapped to a probability 𝜇(𝑃𝑖) using
a probability measure 𝜇 : ℰ → [0, 1], where ℰ is
the set of all events, (i.e., projectors on a given
Hilbert space), subject to the following constraints:
𝜇(0) = 0, 𝜇(1) = 1, 𝜇 (1− 𝑃 ) = 1 − 𝜇 (𝑃 ), and for
each pair of orthogonal projectors 𝑃0 and 𝑃1:
𝜇 (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) = 𝜇 (𝑃0) + 𝜇 (𝑃1) . (1)
Given a Hilbert space ℋ of dimension 𝑑 and a prob-
ability assignment for every projector 𝑃 , we can de-
fine the expectation value of an observable O having
spectral decomposition O =
∑︀𝑑
𝑖=1 𝜆𝑖𝑃𝑖, with eigen-
values 𝜆𝑖 ∈ R, as [19, 29]:
⟨O⟩𝜇 =
𝑑∑︁
𝑖=1
𝜆𝑖𝜇(𝑃𝑖) . (2)
A conventional quantum probability measure can
easily be constructed using the Born rule if one
knows the current pure normalized quantum state
|𝜑⟩ ∈ ℋ; then the Born rule induces a probabil-
ity measure 𝜇𝐵𝜑 defined as 𝜇
𝐵
𝜑 (𝑃 ) = ⟨𝜑|𝑃 |𝜑⟩. For
mixed states 𝜌 =
∑︀𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑞𝑗 |𝜑𝑗⟩⟨𝜑𝑗 |, where |𝜑𝑗⟩ ∈ ℋ,
𝑞𝑗 > 0, and
∑︀𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑞𝑗 = 1, the generalized Born
rule induces a probability measure 𝜇𝐵𝜌 defined as
𝜇𝐵𝜌 (𝑃 ) = Tr (𝜌𝑃 ) =
∑︀𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑞𝑗𝜇
𝐵
𝜑𝑗
(𝑃 ) [19, 25, 26].
The quantum probability postulates assume a
mathematical idealization in which quantum states
and measurements are both infinitely precise, i.e.,
sharp. In an actual experimental setup with an en-
semble of quantum states that would ideally be iden-
tical, but are not actually identically prepared, with
imperfections and inaccuracies in measuring devices,
an experimenter might only be able to determine
that the probability of an event 𝑃 is concentrated in
the range [0.49, 0.51] instead of being precisely 0.5.
The spread in this range depends on the amount
of resources (time, energy, money, etc.) that are de-
voted to the experiment. In the classical setting, this
“fuzziness” can be formalized by moving to interval-
valued probability measures (IVPMs), which we ex-
plore in the next section, along with our proposed
extension to the quantum domain.
III. INTERVALS OF UNCERTAINTY
We will start by reviewing classical IVPMs and
then propose our quantum generalization. In the
classical setting, there are several proposals for “im-
precise probabilities” [24, 31, 35–40]. Although these
proposals differ in some details, they all share the
fact that the probability 𝜇(𝐸) of an event 𝐸 is gener-
alized from a single real number to an interval [ℓ, 𝑟],
where ℓ intuitively corresponds to the strength of ev-
idence for the event 𝐸 and 1− 𝑟 corresponds to the
strength of evidence against the same event. Under
some additional assumptions, this interval could be
interpreted as the Gaussian width of a probability
distribution.
We next introduce probability axioms for IVPMs.
First, for each interval [ℓ, 𝑟] we have the natural con-
straint 0 ≤ ℓ ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 1 that guarantees that every
element of the interval can be interpreted as a con-
ventional probability. We also include F = [0, 0]
and T = [1, 1] as limiting intervals that refer, re-
spectively, to the probability interval for impossible
events and for events that are certain. We can write
the latter as 𝜇(∅) = F and 𝜇(Ω) = T, where ∅ is the
empty set and Ω is the event covering the entire sam-
ple space. For each interval [ℓ, 𝑟], we also need the
dual interval [1−𝑟, 1−ℓ] so that if one interval refers
to the probability of an event 𝐸, the dual refers to
the probability of the event’s complement 𝐸. For
example, if we discover as a result of an experiment
that 𝜇(𝐸) = [0.2, 0.3] for some event 𝐸, we may
conclude that 𝜇
(︀
𝐸
)︀
= [0.7, 0.8] for the complemen-
tary event 𝐸. In addition to these simple conditions,
there are some subtle conditions on how intervals are
combined, which we discuss next.
Let 𝐸1 and 𝐸2 be two disjoint events with prob-
abilities 𝜇(𝐸1) = [ℓ1, 𝑟1] and 𝜇(𝐸2) = [ℓ2, 𝑟2]. A
first attempt at calculating the probability of the
combined event that either 𝐸1 or 𝐸2 occurs might
be 𝜇(𝐸1 ∪ 𝐸2) = [ℓ1 + ℓ2, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2]. In some cases,
this is indeed a sensible definition. For example,
if 𝜇(𝐸1) = [0.1, 0.2] and 𝜇(𝐸2) = [0.3, 0.4] we get
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𝜇(𝐸1∪𝐸2) = [0.4, 0.6]. But consider an event 𝐸 such
that 𝜇(𝐸) = [0.2, 0.3] and hence 𝜇
(︀
𝐸
)︀
= [0.7, 0.8].
The two events 𝐸 and 𝐸 are disjoint; the naïve ad-
dition of intervals would give 𝜇
(︀
𝐸 ∪ 𝐸)︀ = [0.9, 1.1],
which is not a valid probability interval. Moreover
the event 𝐸 ∪ 𝐸 is the entire space; its probability
interval should be T which is sharper than [0.9, 1.1].
The problem is that the two intervals are corre-
lated: there is more information in the combined
event than in each event separately so the com-
bined event should be mapped to a sharper interval.
In our example, even though the “true” probabil-
ity of 𝐸 can be anywhere in the range [0.2, 0.3] and
the “true” probability of 𝐸 can be anywhere in the
range [0.7, 0.8], the values are not independent. Any
value of 𝜇(𝐸) ≤ 0.25 will force 𝜇 (︀𝐸)︀ ≥ 0.75. To
account for such subtleties, the axioms of interval-
valued probability do not use a strict equality for
the combination of disjoint events. The correct con-
straint enforcing coherence of the probability assign-
ment for 𝐸1∪𝐸2 when 𝐸1 and 𝐸2 are disjoint is taken
to be:
𝜇(𝐸1 ∪ 𝐸2) ⊆ [ℓ1 + ℓ2, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2] . (3)
Note that for any event 𝐸 with 𝜇(𝐸) = [ℓ, 𝑟], we
always have 𝜇(Ω) = T ⊆ [ℓ, 𝑟] + [1 − 𝑟, 1 − ℓ] =
𝜇(𝐸) ∪ 𝜇 (︀𝐸)︀.
When combining non-disjoint events, there is a
further subtlety whose resolution will give us the
final general condition for IVPMs. For events 𝐸1
and 𝐸2, not necessarily disjoint, we have:
𝜇(𝐸1 ∪ 𝐸2) + 𝜇(𝐸1 ∩ 𝐸2) ⊆ 𝜇(𝐸1) + 𝜇(𝐸2) , (4)
which is a generalization of the classical inclusion-
exclusion principle that uses ⊆ instead of = for the
same reason as before. The new condition, known
as convexity [31, 37, 38, 41–43], reduces to the previ-
ously motivated Eq. (3) when the events are disjoint,
i.e., when 𝜇(𝐸1 ∩ 𝐸2) = 0.
We now have the necessary ingredients to de-
fine the quantum extension, QIVPMs, as a gener-
alization of both classical IVPMs and conventional
quantum probability measures. We will show that
QIVPMs reduce to classical IVPMs when the space
of quantum events ℰ is restricted to mutually com-
muting events ℰ𝐶 , i.e., to compatible events that
can be measured simultaneously. In Sec. V we will
discuss the connection between QIVPMs and con-
ventional quantum probability measures in detail.
Definition 1 (QIVPM). Assume a collection of in-
tervalsI including F and T with addition and scalar
multiplication defined as follows:
[ℓ1, 𝑟1] + [ℓ2, 𝑟2] = [ℓ1 + ℓ2, 𝑟1 + 𝑟2] and (5a)
𝑥[ℓ, 𝑟] =
{︃
[𝑥ℓ, 𝑥𝑟] for 𝑥 ≥ 0 ;
[𝑥𝑟, 𝑥ℓ] for 𝑥 ≤ 0 . (5b)
Then we take a QIVPM ?¯? to be an assignment of
an interval to each event (projection operator 𝑃 )
subject to the following constraints:
?¯?(0) = F , (6a)
?¯?(1) = T , (6b)
?¯? (1− 𝑃 ) = T− ?¯? (𝑃 ) , (6c)
and satisfying for each pair of commuting projec-
tors 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 with 𝑃0𝑃1 = 𝑃1𝑃0,
?¯? (𝑃0 + 𝑃1 − 𝑃0𝑃1) + ?¯? (𝑃0𝑃1) ⊆ ?¯? (𝑃0) + ?¯? (𝑃1) .
(7)
The first three constraints, Eqs. (6), are the direct
counterpart of the corresponding ones for classical
IVPMs. Note that the minus sign appearing in
Eq. (6c) is accommodated by the 𝑥 ≤ 0 case in
Eq. (5b). With the understanding that the union of
classical sets 𝐸1 ∪𝐸2 is replaced by 𝑃0 + 𝑃1 − 𝑃0𝑃1
in the case of quantum projection operators [30], the
last condition, Eq. (7), is a direct counterpart of the
convexity condition of Eq. (4). Thus our definition
of QIVPMs merges aspects of both classical IVPMs
and quantum probability measures.
Our definition of QIVPMs is consistent with
classical IVPMs in the sense that a restriction of
QIVPMs to mutually commuting events, ℰ𝐶 , re-
covers the definition of classical IVPMs [24]. The
proof of this fact is included in the forthcoming the-
sis by the first author [44]. A consequence is that
known properties of classical IVPMs directly hold
for QIVPMs when one restricts to mutually com-
muting events, ℰ𝐶 . In particular, in the classical
world, it is impossible for experiments to result in
probabilities that are inconsistent with some state of
the system under consideration, i.e., all IVPMs must
have a non-empty “core” [45]. Interestingly, as we
show in Sec. V, it is possible in the quantum world
for the probabilities associated with some events to
be inconsistent with any quantum state, i.e., for the
QIVPM to have an empty core; in that case, one can-
not guarantee non-empty cores for finite-precision
attempts at proving Gleason’s theorem by extending
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the Born measure 𝜇𝐵𝜌 (𝑃 ) to QIVPMs ?¯? (𝑃 ). How-
ever, if we restrict ourselves to the set ℰ𝐶 of mutually
commuting events, the situation reverts to the clas-
sical case in which probabilities always determine at
least one state.
We now give the necessary technical definitions to
prove this non-empty core property.
Definition 2 (Consistency). We say a QIVPM ?¯? is
consistent with a state 𝜌 and a projector 𝑃 if the in-
terval ?¯?(𝑃 ) contains the exact probability calculated
by the Born rule [19, 25, 26], i.e.,
𝜇𝐵𝜌 (𝑃 ) = Tr (𝜌𝑃 ) ∈ ?¯? (𝑃 ) . (8)
In contrast with classical probability spaces [45],
there is no guarantee that there exists a state 𝜌 that
satisfies Eq. (8) and therefore is consistent with a
QIVPM.
We next refine the concept of consistency by in-
troducing the idea of a “core” set of states relative
to subspaces. First, we define ℰ ′ as a subspace of a
set of events ℰ if ℰ ′ contains the projectors 0 and 1
and is closed under complements, sums, and prod-
ucts. In particular, for any projector 𝑃 ∈ ℰ ′, we
have 1−𝑃 ∈ ℰ ′ and for each pair of commuting pro-
jectors 𝑃0 ∈ ℰ ′ and 𝑃1 ∈ ℰ ′, we have 𝑃0+𝑃1−𝑃0𝑃1
and 𝑃0𝑃1 ∈ ℰ ′.
Definition 3 (The core of a probability measure).
The core ℋ (?¯?, ℰ ′) of a probability measure ?¯? relative
to a subspace of events ℰ ′ is the collection of all
states 𝜌 that are consistent with ?¯? on every projector
in ℰ ′, that is
ℋ (?¯?, ℰ ′) = {︀𝜌 ⃒⃒ ∀𝑃 ∈ ℰ ′, 𝜇𝐵𝜌 (𝑃 ) ∈ ?¯? (𝑃 )}︀ . (9)
We are now in position to state and prove that,
for the special case of commuting events, a QIVPM
will always have a non-empty core.
Theorem 1 (Non-empty Core for Compatible Mea-
surements). For every QIVPM ?¯? : ℰ → I , if a sub-
space of events ℰ𝐶 ⊆ ℰ commutes, then ℋ (?¯?, ℰ𝐶) ̸=
∅.
An outline of the proof, detailed in the forthcom-
ing thesis [44], proceeds as follows. From a subspace
ℰ𝐶 of mutually commuting events, one can construct
a partial orthonormal basis by diagonalization, and
complete this to a full orthonormal basis ℰ𝐶 . We can
then build a bijection between the QIVPM on the set
of projectors associated with this basis and the set
of classical events corresponding to this basis. Using
this correspondence together with the classical result
by Shapley [31, 37, 41, 42], we can establish that for
the special case of commuting events, a QIVPM will
always have a non-empty core.
We conclude this section with a generalization
of expectation values of observables in the context
of QIVPMs. In conventional quantum mechanics
the expectation value of an observable as defined in
Eq. (2) is a unique real number. The generalization
to QIVPMs implies that this expectation value will
itself become bounded by an interval.
Definition 4 (Expectation Value of Observables
over QIVPMs). Let I be a set of intervals; ℋ a
Hilbert space of dimension 𝑑 with event space ℰ ;
and O an observable with spectral decomposition∑︀𝑑
𝑖=1 𝜆𝑖𝑃𝑖. Let ℰ ′ be the minimal subspace of events
containing all the projectors 𝑃𝑖 in the spectral de-
composition of O and define:
⟨O⟩?¯? =
[︃
min
𝜌∈ℋ(?¯?,ℰ′)
⟨O⟩𝜇𝐵𝜌 , max𝜌∈ℋ(?¯?,ℰ′) ⟨O⟩𝜇𝐵𝜌
]︃
. (10)
Intuitively the expectation value of an observable
relative to a QIVPM ?¯? lies between two possible out-
comes, which themselves lie between the minimum
and maximum bounds of the probability intervals as-
sociated with each state 𝜌 that is consistent with ?¯?
on every projector in the spectral decomposition of
the observable. If ?¯? is a conventional (Born) proba-
bility measure induced by a state 𝜌, then the Born
rule probability induced by every state in ℋ (?¯?, ℰ ′)
will be 𝜇𝐵𝜌 and the interval collapses to a point, thus
reducing the definition to that of Eq. (2) [44]. We
also note that, when restricted to commuting projec-
tors, Eq. (10) is consistent with the classical notion
of the Choquet integral [31, 37, 46] which is used to
calculate the expectation value of random variables
as a weighted average [44].
IV. THE KOCHEN-SPECKER THEOREM
AND CONTEXTUALITY
Our generalization of quantum probability mea-
sures to QIVPMs allows us to strengthen the scope
of one of the fundamental theorems of quantum
physics: the Kochen-Specker theorem [14–20]. Our
finite-precision extension of that theorem will sug-
gest a resolution to the debate initiated by Meyer
and Mermin on the relevance of the Kochen-Specker
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to experimental, and hence finite-precision, quan-
tum measurements [1–13]. Specifically, the origi-
nal Kochen-Specker theorem is formulated using a
model quantum mechanical system that has definite
values at all times [20], i.e., its observables have
infinitely precise values at all times. Our interval-
valued probability framework will allow us to state,
and prove, a stronger version of the theorem that
holds even if the observables have values that are
only definite up to some precision specified by a pa-
rameter 𝛿. Our approach provides a quantitative
realization of Mermin’s intuition [5]:
. . . although the outcomes deduced from
such imperfect measurements will occa-
sionally differ dramatically from those
allowed in the ideal case, if the mis-
alignment is very slight, the statistical
distribution of outcomes will differ only
slightly from the ideal case.
A. Finite-Precision Extension of the
Kochen-Specker Theorem
The first step in our formalization is to introduce
a family of QIVPMs parameterized by an uncer-
tainty 𝛿, which we call 𝛿-deterministic QIVPMs.
Definition 5 (𝛿-Determinism). A QIVPM ?¯? : ℰ →
I is 𝛿-deterministic if, for every event 𝑃 ∈ ℰ , we
have that either ?¯? (𝑃 ) ⊆ [0, 𝛿] or ?¯? (𝑃 ) ⊆ [1− 𝛿, 1].
This definition puts no restrictions on the set of in-
tervals itself, only on which intervals are assigned to
events. When 𝛿 = 0, every event must be assigned
a probability either in F or in T, i.e., every event
is completely determined with certainty. As 𝛿 gets
larger, the QIVPM allows for more indeterminate
behavior.
The expectation value of an observable O in a
Hilbert space ℋ of dimension 𝑑 relative to a 0-
deterministic QIVPM is fully determinate and is
equal to one of the eigenvalues 𝜆𝑖 of that observ-
able. To see this, note that given an orthonormal
basis Ω = {|𝜓0⟩ , |𝜓1⟩ , . . . , |𝜓𝑑−1⟩}, a 0-deterministic
QIVPM must map exactly one of the projectors
|𝜓𝑖⟩⟨𝜓𝑖| to T and all others to F. This is because, by
Eq. (6b), we have ?¯?
(︁∑︀𝑑−1
𝑗=0 |𝜓𝑗⟩⟨𝜓𝑗 |
)︁
= T and by in-
ductively applying Eq. (7), we must have one of the
?¯?(|𝜓𝑖⟩⟨𝜓𝑖|) = T and all others mapped to F. Given
any state 𝜌 that is consistent with this QIVPM on
all the projectors in Ω, we have by Eq. (9) that 𝜇𝐵𝜌
must also map exactly one of the projectors in Ω to
1 and all others to 0. If an observable has a spectral
decomposition along Ω then, by Eq. (2), its expecta-
tion value relative to 𝜇𝐵𝜌 is the eigenvalue 𝜆𝑖 whose
projector is mapped to 1. It therefore follows, by
Eq. (10), that the expectation value relative to the
0-deterministic ?¯? is fully determinate and lies in the
interval [𝜆𝑖, 𝜆𝑖].
We can now proceed with the main technical re-
sult of this section. We first observe that the origi-
nal Kochen-Specker theorem is a statement regard-
ing the non-existence of a 0-deterministic QIVPM,
and generalize to a corresponding statement about
𝛿-deterministic QIVPMs.
Theorem 2 (0-Deterministic Variant of the
Kochen-Specker Theorem). Given a Hilbert space ℋ
of dimension 𝑑 ≥ 3, there is no 0-deterministic mea-
sure ?¯? mapping every event to either F or T.
To explain why this result is equivalent to the orig-
inal Kochen-Specker theorem and to prove it at the
same time, we proceed by assuming a 0-deterministic
QIVPM ?¯? and derive the same contradiction as the
original Kochen-Specker theorem. Instead of adapt-
ing the more complicated proof for 𝑑 = 3, the coun-
terexample presented below uses the simpler proof
for a Hilbert space of dimension 𝑑 = 4 and is con-
structed as follows.
We consider a two spin- 12 Hilbert space ℋ =ℋ1 ⊗ℋ2 of dimension 𝑑 = 4. We use the same nine
observables O𝑖𝑗 with 𝑖 and 𝑗 ranging over {0, 1, 2}
from the Mermin-Peres “magic square” used to prove
the Kochen-Specker theorem [17, 18, 30]:
O𝑖𝑗 𝑗 = 0 𝑗 = 1 𝑗 = 2
𝑖 = 0 1⊗ 𝜎𝑧 𝜎𝑧 ⊗ 1 𝜎𝑧 ⊗ 𝜎𝑧
𝑖 = 1 𝜎𝑥 ⊗ 1 1⊗ 𝜎𝑥 𝜎𝑥 ⊗ 𝜎𝑥
𝑖 = 2 𝜎𝑥 ⊗ 𝜎𝑧 𝜎𝑧 ⊗ 𝜎𝑥 𝜎𝑦 ⊗ 𝜎𝑦
The observables are constructed using the Pauli ma-
trices {1, 𝜎𝑥, 𝜎𝑦, 𝜎𝑧} whose eigenvalues are all ei-
ther 1 or −1 [16, 19, 26, 29, 30]. They are ar-
ranged such that in each row and column, except
the column 𝑗 = 2, every observable is the product
of the other two. In the 𝑗 = 2 column, we have
instead that (𝜎𝑧 ⊗ 𝜎𝑧) (𝜎𝑥 ⊗ 𝜎𝑥) = −𝜎𝑦 ⊗ 𝜎𝑦. Now
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assume a 0-deterministic QIVPM ?¯?; the expecta-
tion values of the observables in each row relative to
this 0-deterministic QIVPM are fully determinate
and must lie in either the interval [1, 1] or the in-
terval [−1,−1] depending on which eigenvalue is the
one whose associated projector is certain. Since the
product of any two observables in a row is equal
to the third, there must be an even number of oc-
currences of the interval [−1,−1] in each row and
hence in the entire table [44]. However, looking at
the expectation values of the observables in each col-
umn, there must be an even number of occurrences
of the interval [−1,−1] in the first two columns and
an odd number in the 𝑗 = 2 column and hence in the
entire table [44]. The contradiction implies the non-
existence of the assumed 0-deterministic QIVPM.
Our framework allows us to generalize the above
theorem to state that for small enough 𝛿, it is im-
possible to have 𝛿-deterministic QIVPMs.
We next prove a main result of this paper which is
a stronger statement of contextuality that includes
the effects of finite-precision. Every QIVPM must
map some events to truly uncertain intervals, not
just “almost definite intervals.” The proof requires
two simple lemmas that we present first.
The first lemma shows a simpler way to prove the
convexity condition. Recall that the convexity con-
dition for a QIVPM ?¯? : ℰ → I states that for
each pair of commuting projectors 𝑃 and 𝑃 ′ with
𝑃𝑃 ′ = 𝑃 ′𝑃 , the following equation holds:
?¯? (𝑃 + 𝑃 ′ − 𝑃𝑃 ′)+?¯? (𝑃𝑃 ′) ⊆ ?¯? (𝑃 )+?¯? (𝑃 ′) . (11)
Lemma 1. To verify the convexity condition of a
QIVPM ?¯? : ℰ → I , it is sufficient to check that:
?¯? (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) = ?¯? (𝑃0) + ?¯? (𝑃1) (12)
for all orthogonal projectors 𝑃0 and 𝑃1.
The proof follows the outline of the proof of the clas-
sical inclusion-exclusion principle. From the com-
muting projectors 𝑃 and 𝑃 ′, we construct the fol-
lowing three orthogonal projectors: 𝑃𝑃 ′, 𝑃 (1−𝑃 ′),
and (1− 𝑃 )𝑃 ′. Then we proceed as follows:
?¯? (𝑃 + 𝑃 ′ − 𝑃𝑃 ′) + ?¯? (𝑃𝑃 ′)
= ?¯? (𝑃𝑃 ′ + 𝑃 (1− 𝑃 ′) + 𝑃 ′ − 𝑃𝑃 ′) + ?¯? (𝑃𝑃 ′) (because 𝑃 = 𝑃𝑃 ′ + 𝑃 − 𝑃𝑃 ′)
= ?¯? (𝑃 (1− 𝑃 ′) + 𝑃 ′) + ?¯? (𝑃𝑃 ′)
= ?¯? (𝑃 (1− 𝑃 ′) + 𝑃𝑃 ′ + (1− 𝑃 )𝑃 ′) + ?¯? (𝑃𝑃 ′) (because 𝑃 ′ = 𝑃𝑃 ′ + 𝑃 ′ − 𝑃𝑃 ′)
= ?¯?(𝑃 (1− 𝑃 ′)) + ?¯?(𝑃𝑃 ′) + ?¯?((1− 𝑃 )𝑃 ′) + ?¯? (𝑃𝑃 ′) (using Eq. (12) twice)
= ?¯?(𝑃 (1− 𝑃 ′) + 𝑃𝑃 ′) + ?¯?((1− 𝑃 )𝑃 ′ + 𝑃𝑃 ′) (using Eq. (12) twice)
= ?¯?(𝑃 ) + ?¯?(𝑃 ′)
The next lemma relates 𝛿-deterministic QIVPMs
with 𝛿 < 13 to 0-deterministic QIVPMs.
Lemma 2. From any 𝛿-deterministic QIVPM ?¯? :
ℰ → I with 𝛿 < 13 , we can construct a 0-
deterministic QIVPM ?¯?𝐷 : ℰ → {F,T} defined as
follows:
?¯?𝐷 (𝑃 ) =
{︃
F if ?¯? (𝑃 ) ⊆ [0, 𝛿] ;
T if ?¯? (𝑃 ) ⊆ [1− 𝛿, 1] . (13)
The most important part of the proof is to verify the
convexity condition for ?¯?𝐷. By Lemma 1, it is suffi-
cient to verify the following equation for orthogonal
projectors 𝑃0 and 𝑃1,
?¯?𝐷 (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) = ?¯?
𝐷 (𝑃0) + ?¯?
𝐷 (𝑃1) , (14)
for two conditions, which we now examine in detail.
When one of ?¯?𝐷 (𝑃0) and ?¯?𝐷 (𝑃1) is T, say
?¯?𝐷 (𝑃0) = F and ?¯?𝐷 (𝑃1) = T, we have
?¯? (𝑃0) ⊆ [0, 𝛿] and ?¯? (𝑃1) ⊆ [1− 𝛿, 1] which im-
plies ?¯? (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) ⊆ [1− 𝛿, 1 + 𝛿]. Since ?¯? (𝑃0 + 𝑃1)
is a subset of [0, 1], ?¯? (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) must be a subset of
[1− 𝛿, 1], which implies ?¯?𝐷 (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) is also T, thus
satisfying Eq. (14).
When both ?¯?𝐷 (𝑃0) and ?¯?𝐷 (𝑃1) are F, we
have both ?¯? (𝑃0) and ?¯? (𝑃1) ⊆ [0, 𝛿] which im-
plies ?¯? (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) ⊆ [0, 2𝛿]. Since we assume 𝛿 <
1
3 , [0, 2𝛿] and [1− 𝛿, 1] are disjoint, which implies
?¯? (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) and [1− 𝛿, 1] are disjoint. Together with
the fact that ?¯? (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) is a subset of either [0, 𝛿]
or [1− 𝛿, 1], ?¯? (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) must be a subset of [0, 𝛿],
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CFigure 1. The region to the left of the vertical line at
𝛿 = 1
3
is where we assume small measurement degra-
dation; in that region our extension of the KS theorem
definitely demonstrates contextuality (C). In the region
to the right, the degradation of the data is large and
our extension of the KS theorem no longer refutes other
explanations for the experimental data.
which implies ?¯?𝐷 (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) = F, and hence also
Eq. (14) is again satisfied.
Theorem 3 (Finite-precision Extension of the
Kochen-Specker Theorem). Given a Hilbert space
ℋ of dimension 𝑑 ≥ 3, there is no 𝛿-deterministic
QIVPM for 𝛿 < 13 .
The proof is by contradiction: Suppose there is a 𝛿-
deterministic QIVPM ?¯? : ℰ → I . By Lemma 2, we
can construct a 0-deterministic QIVPM; however, by
Thm. 2, such 0-deterministic QIVPMs do not exist.
The bound 𝛿 < 13 is tight as it is possible to con-
struct a 13 -deterministic QIVPM ?¯? : ℰ → I . For ex-
ample, consider a three-dimensional Hilbert space ℋ
with orthonormal basis {|0⟩ , |1⟩ , |2⟩} and a state
𝜌 = 13 |0⟩⟨0| + 13 |1⟩⟨1| + 13 |2⟩⟨2|. Let 𝑃 be an opera-
tor projecting onto an 𝑛-dimensional subspace of ℋ,
where 𝑛 ≤ 3. It is straightforward to check that
𝜇𝐵𝜌 (𝑃 ) =
𝑛
3 . Therefore, ?¯? (𝑃 ) =
[︀
𝜇𝐵𝜌 (𝑃 ) , 𝜇
𝐵
𝜌 (𝑃 )
]︀
is a valid 13 -deterministic QIVPM.
When 𝛿 ≥ 13 , i.e, when the uncertainty in measure-
ments becomes so large, it becomes possible to map
every observable to some (quite inaccurate) proba-
bility interval, thus invalidating the Kochen-Specker
theorem.
We can summarize and illustrate the above argu-
ments using Fig. 1.
As is the case for conventional, infinitely-precise,
quantum probability measures, the theorem is only
applicable to dimensions 𝑑 ≥ 3. Indeed when the
Hilbert space has dimension 2, it is straightforward
to construct a 0-deterministic QIVPM as follows.
Consider a non-contextual hidden variable model
for 𝑑 = 2 (e.g., as proposed by Bell or Kochen-
Specker [14, 15]). Such a two-dimensional model as-
signs definite values to all observables at all times,
and hence assigns a determinate probability (0 or
1) to each event. This probability measure directly
induces a 0-deterministic QIVPM by changing 0 to
F and 1 to T. It follows that every 0-deterministic
QIVPM is 𝛿-deterministic.
B. Experimental Data and 𝛿-determinism
We have thus quantified one important aspect of
uncertainty in quantum mechanics—the effect of the
imprecise nature of devices—which is a novel ad-
dition to the theory of measurement. Indeed, as
Heisenberg emphasized in his famous microscope ex-
ample [47], the conventional theory of measurement
states that it is impossible to precisely measure any
property of a system without disturbing it some-
what. Thus, there are fundamental limits to what
one can measure and these limits have tradition-
ally been attributed to complementarity. Our im-
precision represents an additional source of indeter-
minacy beyond the inherent probabilistic nature of
quantum mechanics.
In an experimental setup, 𝛿 is calculated as fol-
lows. To determine the probability of any event, we
typically repeat an experiment 𝑚 times and count
the number of times we witness the event. This as-
sumes that for each run of the experiment we can
determine, using our apparatus, whether the event
occurred or not. Assume an event has an ideal math-
ematical probability of 0, and we repeat the exper-
iment 100 times. In a perfect world we should be
able to refute the event 100 times and calculate that
the probability is 0. We might also observe the event
2 times and refute it 98 times and therefore calcu-
late the probability to be 0.02. Note that this situ-
ation assumes perfect measurement conditions and
remains within the context of conventional (real-
valued) probability theory. The question we focus
on is what happens if we are only able to refute it
97 times and are uncertain 3 times? This is quite
common in actual experiments. Mathematically we
can model this idea by stating that the probability of
the event is in the range [0, 0.03] which says that the
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Table I. Possible probability measures on a Hilbert space of dimension 𝑑 = 3, where ?¯?′2 and ?¯?3 are QIVPMs while
?¯?0, ?¯?1, and ?¯?2 are not. Events are listed in the column labeled by 𝑃 .
𝑃 ?¯?0 (𝑃 ) ?¯?1 (𝑃 ) ?¯?2 (𝑃 ) ?¯?
′
2 (𝑃 ) ?¯?3 (𝑃 )
0 F F F F F
All one-dimensional projectors [0, 0]
[︀
0, 1
4
]︀ [︀
0, 1
3
]︀ [︀
1
3
, 1
3
]︀ [︀
0, 1
2
]︀
All two-dimensional projectors [1, 1]
[︀
3
4
, 1
]︀ [︀
2
3
, 1
]︀ [︀
2
3
, 2
3
]︀ [︀
1
2
, 1
]︀
1 T T T T T
probability of the event could be 0, 0.01, 0.02, or 0.03
as each the three uncertain records could either be
evidence for the event or against it. We just cannot
nail it down given the current experimental results
and therefore represent the evidence as a (𝛿 =)0.03-
deterministic probability measure. The interesting
observation is that the axioms of probability theory
(like additivity and convexity) impose enough con-
straints on the structure of interval-valued quantum
probability measures to make them robust in the
face of small non-vanishing 𝛿’s.
To see this idea in the context of a quantum
experiment, consider a three-dimensional Hilbert
space with one-dimensional projectors 𝑃𝜌, two-
dimensional projectors 𝑃𝜌 + 𝑃𝜎, and an experiment
that is repeated 12 times. By the Kochen-Specker
theorem, it is impossible to build a probability mea-
sure that maps every projection to either 0 = 012
or 1 = 1212 . That is, the assignment ?¯?0 defined in
Table I is not a QIVPM.
Now consider what happens if 14 of the data for
every one-dimensional projector is uncertain. A
potential account of this degradation is to assign
to each event 𝑃 the entire range of possibilities
?¯?1(𝑃 ) as defined in Table I. This measure is not
a valid QIVPM because it does not satisfy the
convexity condition: for any two orthogonal one-
dimensional events 𝑃0 and 𝑃1, the convexity con-
dition requires ?¯?1 (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) ⊆ ?¯?1 (𝑃0) + ?¯?1 (𝑃1),
but ?¯?1 (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) =
[︀
3
4 , 1
]︀
which is not a subset of[︀
0, 12
]︀
= ?¯?1 (𝑃0) + ?¯?1 (𝑃1). Interestingly, it is im-
possible to find any probability measure that would
be consistent with these observations, as the interval[︀
3
4 , 1
]︀
is completely disjoint from the interval
[︀
0, 12
]︀
and no amount of shifting of assumptions regarding
the precise outcome of the uncertain observations
could change that disjointness. However, as shown
next, a sharp transition occurs when 𝛿 = 13 .
When the proportion of uncertain data reaches 13 ,
the probability measure that assigns to each event
the entire range of possibilities is ?¯?2 defined in Ta-
ble I. This is also not a valid probability measure by
the same argument as above. However, in this case
?¯?2 (𝑃0 + 𝑃1) =
[︀
2
3 , 1
]︀
and
[︀
0, 23
]︀
= ?¯?2 (𝑃0) + ?¯?2 (𝑃1)
have a common point. Hence, by assuming that
the uncertain data for one-dimensional projectors al-
ways support the associated event, while those for
two-dimensional projectors always refute the event,
we can find the probability measure ?¯?′2 that can ver-
ified to be a valid QIVPM and is consistent with the
experimental data.
A similar situation happens when more than 13 of
data is uncertain. In particular, if half of the data is
uncertain, the probability measure ?¯?3 that assigns to
each event the entire range of possibilities is already
a QIVPM.
V. THE BORN RULE AND GLEASON’S
THEOREM
A conventional quantum probability measure can
be easily constructed from a state 𝜌 according to the
Born rule [19, 25, 26]. According to Gleason’s theo-
rem [16, 18, 27], this state 𝜌 is also the unique state
consistent with any possible probability measure.
A. Finite-Precision Extension of Gleason’s
Theorem
In order to re-examine these results in our frame-
work, we first reformulate Gleason’s theorem in
QIVPMs using infinitely precise uncountable inter-
vals I∞ = {[𝑥, 𝑥] | 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1]}:
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Table II. QIVPM ?¯? : ℰ → I0 on a Hilbert space of
dimension 𝑑 = 3. Events are listed in the column labeled
by 𝑃 .
𝑃 ?¯? (𝑃 )
0, |0⟩⟨0|, |+⟩⟨+|, |+′⟩⟨+′| F
1, 1− |0⟩⟨0|, 1− |+⟩⟨+|, 1− |+′⟩⟨+′| T
All other projectors U
Theorem 4 (I∞ Variant of the Gleason Theo-
rem). In a Hilbert space ℋ of dimension 𝑑 ≥ 3,
given a QIVPM ?¯? : ℰ → I∞, the state 𝜌 consis-
tent with ?¯? on every projector is unique, i.e., there
exists a unique state 𝜌 such that ℋ (?¯?, ℰ) = {𝜌}.
Now let us consider relaxing I to a countable
set of finite-width intervals. As the intervals in the
image of a QIVPM become less and less sharp, we
expect more and more states to be consistent with
it. In the limit of minimal sharpness, all states 𝜌 are
consistent with the QIVPM
?¯? (𝑃 ) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
F if 𝑃 = 0 ;
T if 𝑃 = 1 ;
U = [0, 1] otherwise
(15)
mapping nearly all projections to the unknown in-
terval U. There is however a subtlety: as shown in
the theorem below, it is possible for an arbitrary
assignment of intervals to projectors to be globally
inconsistent.
Theorem 5 (Empty Cores Exist for General
QIVPMs). There exists a Hilbert space ℋ and a
QIVPM ?¯? : ℰ → I such that ℋ (?¯?, ℰ) = ∅.
To prove this theorem, we need to construct a
QIVPM on some Hilbert space, and verify that
there are no states that are consistent (see Defs. 2
and 3) with it on all possible events. Assume a
Hilbert space of dimension 𝑑 = 3 with orthonor-
mal basis {|0⟩ , |1⟩ , |2⟩}, let |+⟩ = (|0⟩+ |1⟩) /√2,
|+′⟩ = (|0⟩+ |2⟩) /√2, and assign
I0 = {T,F,U} . (16)
The map ?¯? : ℰ → I0 defined in Table II can be
verified to be a QIVPM [44]. Next we will prove by
contradiction that ℋ (?¯?, ℰ) is the empty set. Sup-
pose there is a state 𝜌 =
∑︀𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑞𝑗 |𝜑𝑗⟩⟨𝜑𝑗 | ∈ ℋ (?¯?, ℰ),
where
∑︀𝑁
𝑗=1 𝑞𝑗 = 1 and 𝑞𝑗 > 0. Since we assumed
the core ℋ (?¯?, ℰ) is non-empty, so 𝜇𝐵𝜌 (𝑃 ) ∈ ?¯?(𝑃 ),
and Table II tells us that ?¯?(|0⟩⟨0|) = F = [0, 0],
we must conclude that 𝜇𝐵𝜌 (|0⟩⟨0|) = 0 ∈ [0, 0], and
similarly for |+⟩⟨+| and |+′⟩⟨+′|. If this is true, then
⟨0|𝜑𝑗⟩ = ⟨+|𝜑𝑗⟩ = ⟨+′|𝜑𝑗⟩ = 0 for all 𝑗, and thus
⟨1|𝜑𝑗⟩ =
√
2 ⟨+|𝜑𝑗⟩ − ⟨0|𝜑𝑗⟩ = 0 , (17a)
⟨2|𝜑𝑗⟩ =
√
2 ⟨+′|𝜑𝑗⟩ − ⟨0|𝜑𝑗⟩ = 0 . (17b)
The above equations imply |𝜑𝑗⟩ = |0⟩ ⟨0|𝜑𝑗⟩ +
|1⟩ ⟨1|𝜑𝑗⟩+ |2⟩ ⟨2|𝜑𝑗⟩ = 0, violating the assumption
that |𝜑𝑗⟩ is a normalized state, and thus the theorem
is proved.
The fact that a collection of poor measurements
on a quantum system cannot reveal the underlying
state is not surprising. Under certain conditions, we
can however guarantee that the uncertainty in mea-
surements is consistent with some non-empty collec-
tion of quantum states. Furthermore, we can relate
the uncertainty in measurements to the volume of
quantum states such that, in the limit of infinitely
precise measurements, the volume of states collapses
to a single state.
To that end, we introduce the concept of interval
maps, which we can use to construct a consistent
family of QIVPMs. An interval map 𝑓 : [0, 1] → I
maps every real-valued probability 𝑥 ∈ [0, 1] to a
set of intervals 𝑓 (𝑥) = [ℓ, 𝑟] containing 𝑥, where
[0, 1] denotes the set of real-valued probabilities
(this should not be confused with the interval-valued
probability U). We also need a notion of norm
to quantify the distance between (pure or mixed)
states. The norm of a pure state 𝜌 = |𝜓⟩⟨𝜓| is de-
fined as usual by ‖𝜓‖ = √︀⟨𝜓|𝜓⟩. For any given
Hermitian operator 𝐴, we choose the operator norm
‖𝐴‖ = max‖𝜓‖=1 ‖𝐴 |𝜓⟩‖, which is also known as
the 2-norm or the spectral norm [18, 48–50]. In fact,
for any such matrix, including the density matrix 𝜌,
this norm is the eigenvalue with maximum absolute
value. Then, a finite-precision extension of Gleason’s
theorem can be stated as follows:
Theorem 6 (Finite-Precision Extension of the
Gleason Theorem). Let 𝑓 : [0, 1] → I be an inter-
val map and let the composition 𝑓 ∘𝜇𝐵𝜌 be a QIVPM,
where 𝜇𝐵𝜌 is the probability measure induced by the
Born rule for a given state 𝜌. Let 𝛼 be the maximum
length of intervals in I . If a state 𝜌′ is consistent
with 𝑓 ∘ 𝜇𝐵𝜌 on all events, i.e., 𝜌′ ∈ ℋ
(︀
𝑓 ∘ 𝜇𝐵𝜌 , ℰ
)︀
,
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then the norm of their difference is bounded by 𝛼,
i.e., ‖𝜌− 𝜌′‖ ≤ 𝛼.
The proof proceeds as follows. Given a state 𝜌′
consistent with 𝑓 ∘ 𝜇𝐵𝜌 , we have 𝜇𝐵𝜌′ (|𝜓⟩⟨𝜓|) ∈
𝑓
(︀
𝜇𝐵𝜌 (|𝜓⟩⟨𝜓|)
)︀
for any one-dimensional projector
𝑃 = |𝜓⟩⟨𝜓|. Since the maximum length of the in-
tervals in I is 𝛼, it is also the upper bound of the
difference:⃒⃒
𝜇𝐵𝜌′ (|𝜓⟩⟨𝜓|)− 𝜇𝐵𝜌 (|𝜓⟩⟨𝜓|)
⃒⃒
= |⟨𝜓| 𝜌− 𝜌′|𝜓⟩| ≤ 𝛼 .
Since 𝜌 − 𝜌′ is Hermitian, max‖𝜓‖=1 |⟨𝜓| 𝜌− 𝜌′|𝜓⟩|
is the maximum absolute value of the eigenvalues of
𝜌 − 𝜌′ [29], and equal to ‖𝜌− 𝜌′‖ [49, 50]. Hence,
‖𝜌− 𝜌′‖ ≤ 𝛼.
B. Ultramodular Functions
Theorem 6 generalizes Gleason’s theorem in the
sense that it accounts for a larger class of proba-
bility measures that includes the conventional one
as a limit. The theorem is however “special” in the
sense that it only applies to the particular class of
QIVPMs constructed by composing an interval map
with a conventional quantum probability measure.
QIVPMs constructed in this manner have some pe-
culiar properties that we examine next.
An interval map is called ultramodular if it satis-
fies the following properties:
Definition 6 (Ultramodular Functions). Given a
collection of intervals I including F and T, an in-
terval mapℳ : [0, 1]→ I is called ultramodular if:
ℳ(0) = F , (18a)
ℳ(1) = T , (18b)
ℳ (1− 𝑥) = T−ℳ (𝑥) , (18c)
and for any three numbers 𝑥0, 𝑥1, and 𝑥2 ∈ [0, 1]
such that 𝑦 = 𝑥0 + 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ∈ [0, 1], we have:
ℳ (𝑦) +ℳ (𝑥2) ⊆ℳ (𝑥0 + 𝑥2) +ℳ (𝑥1 + 𝑥2) .
(19)
The first three constraints, Eqs. (18), are the di-
rect counterpart of the corresponding QIVPM con-
straints, Eqs. (6); the last condition, Eq. (19), is
the direct counterpart of the convexity conditions,
Eqs. (4) and (7) [41–43, 46]. Therefore, these condi-
tions guarantee that, for any conventional quantum
probability measure 𝜇, the composition ℳ ∘ 𝜇 de-
fines a valid QIVPM. Conversely, if for every quan-
tum probability measure 𝜇, it is the case that 𝑓 ∘ 𝜇
is a QIVPM, then the interval map 𝑓 is an ultra-
modular function. Formally, we have the following
result:
Theorem 7 (Equivalence of Ultramodular Func-
tions and IVPMs). The following three statements
are equivalent:
1. A function ℳ : [0, 1]→ I is ultramodular.
2. The composite function ℳ ∘ 𝜇 : ℰ𝐶 → I is
a classical IVPM for all classical probability
measures 𝜇 : ℰ𝐶 → [0, 1].
3. The composite function ℳ ∘ 𝜇 : ℰ → I is
a QIVPM for all quantum probability mea-
sures 𝜇 : ℰ → [0, 1].
Statement 1 implies 2 and 3 as we have outlined
above. Conversely, for the quantum case, we want to
show that if ℳ is not ultramodular, then for some
quantum probability measure 𝜇, the compositeℳ∘𝜇
might not be a QIVPM. Suppose there are three
particular numbers 𝑥0, 𝑥1, and 𝑥2 ∈ [0, 1] such that
𝑦 = 𝑥0 + 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ∈ [0, 1], but they don’t satisfy
Eq. (19). Consider the state:
𝜌 = 𝑥0|0⟩⟨0|+ 𝑥1|1⟩⟨1|+ 𝑥2|2⟩⟨2|+ (1− 𝑦) |3⟩⟨3| .
The induced mapℳ∘𝜇𝐵𝜌 constructed using the Born
rule and blurred by ℳ fails to satisfy Eq. (7) when
𝑃0 = |0⟩⟨0| + |2⟩⟨2| and 𝑃1 = |1⟩⟨1| + |2⟩⟨2|. In
other words, this induced map fails to be a QIVPM.
For the classical case, if ℳ is not ultramodular,
we also want to find a classical probability measure
𝜇 : ℰ𝐶 → [0, 1] such that ℳ ∘ 𝜇 is not a classical
IVPM. This can be done by restricting our previ-
ous quantum probability measure 𝜇𝐵𝜌 to the space
of events ℰ𝐶 generated by the mutually commuting
projectors |0⟩⟨0|, |1⟩⟨1|, |2⟩⟨2|, and |3⟩⟨3|. The re-
stricted function 𝜇 = 𝜇𝐵𝜌 |ℰ𝐶 is then a classical prob-
ability measure, and the induced mapℳ∘𝜇 fails to
be a classical IVPM for the same reason as in the
quantum case.
In other words, essential properties of QIVPMs
constructed using interval maps can be gleaned from
the properties of ultramodular functions. The fol-
lowing is a most interesting property in our setting:
Theorem 8 (Range of Ultramodular Functions).
For any ultramodular function ℳ : [0, 1] → I , ei-
ther I = I0 as defined in Eq. (16) or I contains
uncountably many intervals.
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Since ℳ maps to intervals, we can decompose
it into two functions: its left-end and right-end,
where
[︀ℳ𝐿 (𝑥) ,ℳ𝑅 (𝑥)]︀ = ℳ (𝑥). By Eq. (19),
the left-end function ℳ𝐿 : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is Wright-
convex [48, 51, 52], i.e.,
ℳ𝐿 (𝑦)+ℳ𝐿 (𝑥2) ≥ℳ𝐿 (𝑥0 + 𝑥2)+ℳ𝐿 (𝑥1 + 𝑥2)
for three numbers 𝑥0, 𝑥1, and 𝑥2 ∈ [0, 1] with 𝑦 =
𝑥0 + 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 ∈ [0, 1]. Together with the fact that
ℳ𝐿 maps to a bounded interval [0, 1], the left-end
function ℳ𝐿 must be continuous on the unit open
interval (0, 1) [43]. Therefore, either ℳ maps every
number in (0, 1) to the same interval, or the number
of intervals to whichℳ maps must be uncountable.
To summarize, a conventional quantum proba-
bility measure has an uncountable range [0, 1]. A
QIVPM constructed by blurring such a conventional
quantum probability measure must also have an un-
countable range of intervals. Of course, any partic-
ular QIVPM, or any particular experiment, will use
a fixed collection of intervals appropriate for the re-
sources and precision of the particular experiment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Foundational concepts in quantum mechanics,
such as the Kochen-Specker and Gleason theorems,
rely in subtle ways on the use of unbounded re-
sources. By assuming infinitely precise measure-
ments, these two insightful theorems form the foun-
dations of two fundamental aspects of quantum me-
chanics. On the one hand, the Kochen-Specker re-
sult reveals a distinctive aspect of physical reality,
the fact that it is contextual, and, on the other
hand, Gleason’s theorem establishes a relationship
between quantum states and probabilities uniquely
defined by Born’s rule. Our goal in this paper has
been to analyze the physical consequences of a math-
ematical framework that allows for finite precision
measurements by introducing the concept of quan-
tum interval-valued probability. This framework in-
corporates uncertainty in the measurement results
by defining fuzzy probability measures, and includes
standard quantum measurement as the particular in-
stance of sharp, infinitely precise, intervals.
In addition, we showed how these two theorems
emerge as limiting cases of this same framework,
thus connecting two seemingly unrelated aspects of
quantum physics. We noted that arbitrary finite pre-
cision measurement conditions can nullify the main
tenets of both theorems. However, by carefully spec-
ifying experimental uncertainties, we were able to es-
tablish rigorous bounds on the validity of these two
theorems. Therefore, we have established a context
in which infinite precision quantum mechanical the-
ories can be reconciled with finite precision quan-
tum mechanical measurements, and have provided a
possible resolution of the Meyer-Mermin debate on
the impact of finite precision on the Kochen-Specker
theorem [3, 5].
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